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MIDDLE-CLASS LAWYERING IN THE AGE OF
ALZHEIMER'S: THE LAWYER'S DUTIES IN
REPRESENTING A FIDUCIARY
Patrick Emery Longan*
I.

INTRODUCTION AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

More Americans are living longer. In part, the growing number of
elderly people is a matter of demographics as the baby boom
generation ages. It is also a consequence of medical technology.
Diseases that were once fatal in old age are now treatable, leaving a
larger population for other age-related diseases.' Among these is
Alzheimer's, a degenerative disease that gradually robs its victims of
their abilities to remember, think, reason, and judge.2 It eventually
results in dementia, with the result that someone else must make
decisions for the patient with advanced Alzheimer's.- The decision
maker frequently is an adult child of the parent who either holds a
power of attorney or has been appointed by a court as the parent's
guardian. This caretaker frequently employs a lawyer to help with the
decisions that must be made for the patient.
The lawyers who perform this function are not only those who
represent the wealthy. Alzheimer's does not know socioeconomic
boundaries. Perhaps because of Medicare, the medical innovations
that have enabled people to live longer have trickled down to other
strata of the population. The chances of becoming an Alzheimer's
victim increases exponentially with age, and the number of victims is
expected to rise rapidly in coming years.4 Among these victims will be
* William Augustus Bootle Professor of Ethics and Professionalism in the Practice of
Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. A.B., Washington
University, 1979; M.A., University of Sussex, 1980; J.D., University of Chicago, 1983.
I wish to express my thanks to Professor Bruce Green for his invitation to contribute
to this volume and my special thanks to Gretchen Longan for helping me, as always,
to see through the technicalities of legal ethics to the values that should underlie
them.
1. See Richard A. Posner, Aging and Old Age 17-25, 47 (1995) (explaining the
aging process and its effect on the population).
2. For a general discussion of Alzheimer's. see Peter V. Rabins, Dementia and
Alzheimer's Disease:An Overview, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 451 (2001). For more information,
visit the Alzheimer's Association web page at http.//www.alz.org.
3. See Rabins, supra note 2.
4. Erica F. Wood, Dispute Resolution and Dementia: Seeking Solutions, 35 Ga. L
Rev. 785, 788 (2001).
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many members of the middle class who will need guardians or other
caretakers.' The caretakers in turn need the help of lawyers because
they may have to be formally appointed as guardian for the older
person. They may also need legal counsel because they may find
themselves dealing with substantial sums of money. The middle-class
victim of Alzheimer's today is likely to have grown up in the
Depression and, as a result, to have lived more frugally than those
who followed them. Their children are likely to be surprised when
they become caretakers and learn how much their parents have saved
over a lifetime.6 With that surprise will come the realization that they
need legal counsel.
With that surprise also may come temptation. If the caretaker
yields to temptation, the lawyer will encounter some difficult ethical
issues.' The lawyer's ethical dilemmas may arise from either hope or
fear. The lawyer may hope that he or she will be able to prevent or
rectify harmful actions by a caretaker and may fear liability if he or
she does not do so. Lawyers need clear guidance on their options and
their duties.
The existing authorities send mixed messages to the lawyer.
Comment 4 to Rule 1.14 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which deals with the lawyer's duties to a client under a disability,
states that "[i]f the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the
ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward's
interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the
guardian's misconduct. See Rule 1.2(d)."8 This appears to be a clear
directive, but elsewhere the Rules seem to forbid any such action.
First. the reference in this Comment to Rule 1.2(d) is odd, since that
Rule only forbids the lawyer from assisting or counseling a client to
commit a crime or a fraud; it does not impose any general duty to
prevent or rectify a client's actions.9 Furthermore, there is no
permission under the Rules to divulge the caretaker's confidences to
prevent or rectify financial harm to the older person. 0 The ABA
5. For a discussion of duties to fiduciary clients in the context of wards with
moderate wealth, see A. Frank Johns, Fickett's Thicket: The Lawyer's Expanding
Fiduciary and Ethical Boundaries When Serving Older Americansof Moderate Wealth,
32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 445 (1997).
6. One author estimates that the World War II generation will transfer $11
trillion dollars to the next generation. See Wood, supra note 4, at 793 (citing Diane G.
Armstrong, The Retirement Nightmare: How to Save Yourself From Your Heirs and
Protectors-Involuntary Conservatorships and Guardianships 10 (2000)).
7. For an excellent and thorough exploration of a range of issues that might
arise, see Robert B. Fleming and Rebecca C. Morgan, Lawyers' Ethical Dilemmas: A
"Normal" Relationship When Representing Demented Clients and Their Families, 35
Ga. L. Rev. 735 (2001). Another indispensable resource is the Special Issue, Ethical
Issues in Representing Older Clients, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 961 (1994).
8. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R 1.14 cmt. 4 (2001); see also R 1.2(d).
9. R. 1.2(d).
10. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 states:
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removed any doubt on this point in Formal Opinion 94-380, by
concluding that a lawyer representing a fiduciary is bound strictly by
all the Rules of Professional Conduct, especially Rule 1.6's

prohibitions on revealing confidential information."

How can a

lawyer prevent or rectify misconduct without telling someone about
it? The Model Rules thus leave the lawyer relatively sure he has no
ethical option to prevent or rectify misconduct by the guardian, but
scratching his head about the Comment to 1.14 that says he may have

such a duty after all.
The new Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers is at
least clearer, although it may strike fear into the hearts of lawyers for
guardians. Section 51(4) states that a lawyer can have a duty of care
to nonclients under certain circumstances, including when:
(a) the lawyer's client is a trustee, guardian, executor, or fiduciary
acting primarily to perform similar functions for the nonclient;
(b) the lawyer knows that appropriate action by the lawyer is
necessary with respect to a matter within the scope of the
representation to prevent or rectify the breach of a fiduciary duty
owed by the client to the nonclient, where (i) the breach is a crime
or fraud or (ii) the lawyer has assisted or is assisting the breach;
(c) the nonclient is not reasonably able to protect its rights; and

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that
are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except
as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawvyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge
or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of the client.
R 1.6.
11. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility Formal Op. 94-380 (1994).
The opinion begins as follows:
A lawyer who represents the fiduciary in a trust or estate matter is subject to
the same limitations imposed by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as
are all other lawyers. The fact that the fiduciary has obligations to the
beneficiaries of the trust or estate does not in itself either expand or limit the
lawyer's obligations to the fiduciary client under the Model Rules, nor
impose on the lawyer obligations toward the beneficiaries that the lawyer
would not have toward other third parties. Specifically, the lawyer's
obligation to preserve the client's confidences under Rule 1.6 is not altered
by the circumstances that the client is a fiduciary.
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(d) such a duty would not significantly
impair the performance of
12
the lawyer's obligations to the client.
The Restatement makes it clear that lawyers in jurisdictions that
prevent the revelation of confidential information about a client are
not expected to choose between violation of that professional duty
and liability under this section. If the lawyer cannot disclose, then the
lawyer cannot be held liable. 3 Yet many jurisdictions reject the strict
model rule version of 1.6 and permit lawyers to reveal confidential
information to prevent harm, including financial harm.' 4 One concern
for a lawyer in these jurisdictions must be whether, if the Restatement
view is adopted, the lawyer who has the option to prevent harm may
be required to do so or face liability to a nonclient. A related worry is
the possibility of a court imposing liability even if a lawyer does not
know of the malfeasance by a guardian but, in the court's hindsight,
the lawyer should have known about it and should have tried to
prevent it. 5
What should the lawyer's role be when the guardian is
misbehaving? To answer this question requires first some discussion
of why elderly wards might need extra protection from financial abuse
and why existing safeguards are insufficient. If the elderly are in
special danger, and they cannot otherwise be protected, special rules
to enable or require lawyers to protect them may be necessary.
II. THE VULNERABILITY OF THE ELDERLY WARD
In general, lawyers do not owe special duties to people who are not
clients. Lawyers are permitted and expected to represent their clients
within the bounds of the law, while others whose interests are affected
are expected to retain their own counsel to represent them. Why,
then, should we consider the imposition of special duties for lawyers
who assist guardians and other caretakers for the elderly? It may be
easier to see why elderly wards need special protection by examining a
typical scenario.
Suppose that Maxine Bowman is an eighty-year-old widowed
mother of four boys and one girl. Her four sons live in distant states.
Her daughter, Jane, lives nearby and for several years has assumed
full responsibility for caring for Mrs. Bowman. All of Mrs. Bowman's
close friends have either died or are in nursing homes. Mrs. Bowman
herself is no longer able to drive and has started to become forgetful.
Mrs. Bowman is frail but not in immediate need of full-time care. She
12. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 51(4) (1998).
13. See id. § 51 cmt. a.
14. See, e.g., Ga. Rules of Prof'I Conduct R.1.6(b) (2001).
15. See Fickett v. Superior Court, 558 P.2d 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that
a lawyer is liable to ward for not discovering a practice of misappropriation of assets
by guardian). For a case to the contrary, see Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Perry, 1994 Minn.
App., No. C6-93-1573, 1994 WL 101991 (Mn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1994).
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had a stroke five years ago but seems gradually to have recovered her
mental capacity.
Although Mrs. Bowman occasionally will not be able to remember
the precise word she wants to use, she usually laughs off this difficulty.
She has some circulatory problems that make it difficult to walk, but
she seems content to be in her house most of the time. She spends her
days reading (although she requires glasses and large-print reading
material) and watching television. Jane brings her mother groceries
and takes her to the public library. She takes her mother to doctors'
appointments, fills her prescriptions, and ensures that she takes her
medicine.
Caring for her mother has put an enormous strain on Jane
physically, emotionally, and financially.
Just when Jane's own
children have reached ages where they can take care of themselves,
Jane finds herself caring for her increasingly dependent mother. Jane
loves her mother, but resents the burden and resents her brothers for
leaving the care of their mother to her. 6
In recent months, Mrs. Bowman appears to have become neglectful
of some of her financial affairs. Jane found several pension checks on
the kitchen table unopened, and she noticed what appeared to be late
notices for several household bills. When Jane asked her mother
about them, Mrs. Bowman replied that she thought she had taken care
of them and that she would "see to them" right away." Jane became
concerned and went to her mother's bank. With her mother's
permission, the Bank permitted Jane to inspect her mother's account
information. To her amazement, Jane found that her mother had a
balance in her checking account of $25,000 and had a passbook
savings account with another $75,000 in it. She also learned that her
mother had four certificates of deposit of $100,000 each. Jane already
knew that her mother's house is worth $100,000 and is owned free and
clear.
If her mother has Alzheimer's or another form of progressive senile
dementia, Jane may soon find herself in charge of her mother's affairs,
either through a power of attorney or as a court-appointed guardian. 8
She loves her mother. Why should we be especially concerned about
protecting Mrs. Bowman from her own daughter? One reason is that
Mrs. Bowman is especially vulnerable to financial abuse by Jane, if

16. It is usually a daughter or daughter-in-law who bears the burden as primary
caretaker for an elderly person. Posner, supra note 1, at 285.
17. Victims of Alzheimer's in the early stages of the disease often experience little
or no decline in their cognitive capacity. Forgetfulness that begins to interfere with
the older person's daily life, and his or her ability to live independently, is a symptom
of the onset of Alzheimer's. See Rabins, supra note 2, at 458.
18. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 29-5-2 (2001) (listing in order of preference for
appointment of a guardian in Georgia, a person selected by the ward before his or her
incapacity, the ward's spouse, and the ward's child).
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Jane is so inclined.19 Those who intend to steal target the elderly for
the same reason John Dillinger robbed banks: it is where the money
is. They are tempting targets not only because they have money but
also because they are often less able to make wise decisions about
money.2" This is particularly true in the case of an older person who
has a guardian or other caretaker. By definition, this person no longer
has either the interest or the capacity to monitor his or her financial
interests.
The older person's isolation also contributes to this vulnerability.
With fewer people for the elderly to talk to, it is less likely that anyone
would learn of and question the financial decisions made by the
caretaker. The isolated elderly person may also be utterly dependent
upon the caretaker for transportation and other types of care and may
fear to question financial decisions that seem questionable., There
may also be some natural disinclination to believe that a grown child
would do anything wrong. For all these reasons, the elderly are sitting
ducks for financial abuse.
The problem goes deeper, however, than the older person's
vulnerability to a larcenous caregiver. If financial abuse of the elderly
occurred only when the adult child happened to be a scoundrel, then
we would have a shameful but isolated problem. Most people are not
scoundrels. However, caretakers who in all other contexts would
consider themselves to be honest people may not hesitate to take
advantage of an elderly parent in their care. Jane probably feels some
sense of entitlement to her mother's resources because, after all, it is
Jane who is bearing the burden of caring for her mother. Her
brothers are far away and doing nothing to help, so why shouldn't
Jane get some "compensation" for the burden. Jane might therefore
be able to convince herself that it is alright to "borrow" some of her
mother's money for a new business venture, or use her mother's
money to pay for an addition to her house so that her mother "will be
comfortable" when she has to stay with Jane. People in Jane's
position are just as vulnerable to rationalizing misbehavior as the
wards are to being victimized. Some way of protecting the Mrs.
Bowmans of the world needs to be found.

19. For a general discussion of the vulnerabilities of the elderly, see Seymour
Moskowitz, Saving Granny From the Wolf. Elder Abuse and Neglect-The Legal
Framework,31 Conn. L. Rev. 77 (1998).
20. It is worth remembering in this context that there are special criminal laws for
financial scams that target the elderly. These statutes recognize that the elderly have
money and are too easily parted from it. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 825.103 (West

2000).
21. For example, in Albright v. Burns, an elderly person expressed some concern
about the sale of one of his principal assets but was convinced to let it go ahead.
Albright v. Burns, 503 A.2d 386, 388 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986)
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One response to these concerns is that existing laws forbid taking
advantage of the elderly. 22 The problem, however, is one of detection.
Mrs. Bowman is unable or unwilling to look after herself. Her
husband is dead, all her friends are dead or in nursing homes, and her
sons live far away and pay little attention to her. She interacts only
with her daughter and those her daughter permits her to see. The civil
and criminal laws designed to protect the elderly will only work in the
unlikely event that someone detects the misbehavior.
That someone may be the lawyer for the guardian. Lawyers who
help the guardians or other caretakers are in a special position to
detect financial abuse.' Many of the transactions that a guardian or
other caretaker undertakes will require the service of a lavyer. For
example, the older person's bank may call to ask about the power of
attorney under which the caretaker is purporting to act. A court may
require a guardian to render periodic accountings for which a lawyer
may be necessary. The purchase or sale of real property, or the
documentation of loans or other financial transactions, may also
involve the lawyer. The lawyer is best situated to notice if a fiduciary
to an older person is engaging in financial abuse. We require health
care professionals to report cases of suspected child abuse because
they are in a unique position to notice if a child, who is otherwise
vulnerable to adults, is being abused. Similarly, a lawyer should have
to take steps to protect an older person who is being abused
financially.
The elderly are, thus, particularly subject to financial abuse, and
lawyers who represent their guardians may be uniquely situated to
observe the abuse. Given these facts, what should we enable lawyers
to do, and what should we expect of them?
III. OPTIONS FOR ATTORNEY PREVENTION OF FINANCIAL ABUSE BY
A FIDUCIARY

A. Counseling Without the Right to Disclose
The previous section used the analogy of the doctor who observes a
child who appears to have been abused. The analogy, however, is not
a perfect one. Child abusers do not generally consult with doctors
about the abuse ahead of time. They do not present themselves
before the damage is done and give the doctor a chance to dissuade
them. Lawyers, on the other hand, are often consulted ahead of time
and given the chance to talk their clients out of behaving badly. As
one veteran lawyer described it, "half the practice of a decent lawyer
22. See supra note 20 (explaining that Florida, for example, has special criminal
laws for financial scams that target the elderly).
23. For another discussion of this point, see Robert W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary's
Fiduciary:Legal Ethics in FiduciaryRepresentation,1994 U. Ill. L Rev. 889, 936-37.
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consists in telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and
should stop" what they are doing.24
What can we expect of a counseling session between a lawyer and a
guardian who reveals an intention to abuse his or her position? The
lawyer cannot assist a client who is planning a crime or a fraud, but
the lawyer is expected to discuss the proposed course of action with
the client.' Presumably the lawyer will explain to the client what is
wrong with the proposal. It might be a breach of fiduciary duty, a
fraud, a crime, or all three. The lawyer would explain to the client the
civil and criminal consequences of doing the wrong thing. In the
particular context of a guardian of an elderly parent, one would
expect the lawyer to go further. Under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, a lawyer who is counseling a client could "refer
not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic,
social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's
situation." 6 If Jane, the daughter, is the client, the lawyer might be
able to appeal to the better part of her nature and dissuade her from
improper action.
Sometimes the counseling will work, and no other action by the
lawyer will be necessary. The counseling may be effective because the
client feels free to share her plans with the lawyer. One inference
might be that lawyers should be forbidden from sharing the
confidential plans of their client-fiduciary in order to promote
communication and give the counseling a better chance to work. Any
rule of disclosure or liability that would drive fiduciaries underground
and away from their lawyers eliminates the opportunities for
preventive lawyering. Resolution of the lawyer's ethical dilemma in
this situation must be sensitive to this risk.
However, as discussed above, many of the shenanigans in which the
guardian would like to engage will require the services of a lawyer. A
transfer of title to a house or the documentation of a loan to the
guardian's business would need to go through the lawyer's hands. A
periodic report to the court usually involves a lawyer. 27 Although
confidentiality might at the margin promote communication, most of
the plans will be disclosed anyway. With or without an assurance of
confidentiality, lawyers will have the chance to counsel their clients
and talk them out of wrongful conduct. Sometimes they will succeed.
But what if they do not?

24. This statement is attributed to Elihu Root, who served as Secretary of War,
Secretary of State, and as a United States Senator. See Sol M. Linowitz, The
Betrayed Profession 4 (1994).
25. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.2(d) (2001).
26. R. 2.1.
27. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 29-2-44 (2001) (requiring annual accounting by
guardians in Georgia).
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Withdrawal as a Way to Prevent FinancialAbuse
1.

Quiet Withdrawal

If the counseling does not do the job, the lawyer might try to solve
the problem by withdrawing from the representation of the guardian.
Suppose Jane came to the lawyer with a plan to spend her mother's
money on an addition to Jane's house (a criminal and fraudulent
misappropriation of funds). What is the lawyer to do? One thing is
certain: he must withdraw from representing Jane. He has no choice
but to withdraw if continued representation would result in a violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and to help Jane here would be
to assist her with a fraudulent scheme.'
The question remains, however, what good this does for Mrs.
Bowman. If the lawyer withdraws quietly and does nothing more, then
he has made matters worse, at least temporarily. The elderly ward is
left at the mercy of a corrupt fiduciary, without even the lawyer's
voice of reason to slow down the misappropriation. Withdrawal
serves only the lawyer and not the older person who is the victim of
the caretaker. As we have seen, the lawyer for the caretaker of an
older person is in a unique position to monitor financial abuse. If the
lawyer merely runs quietly away when he sees such abuse, then the
caretaker is much more likely to get away with the scheme. Jane can
milk her mother's estate with impunity if the worst she has to fear is
that the lawyer will resign. Jane's reaction is predictable: good
riddance. She probably can find a new lawyer dumb enough or
corrupt enough to help her. Unless something more can be done, the
mandatory withdrawal of the lawyer in this situation leaves the elderly
ward worse off.
2.

Noisy Withdrawal as a Solution

Another possibility would be to permit or require the lawyer for the
caretaker to make a "noisy withdrawal." Under ABA Formal
Opinion 92-366, a lawyer must withdraw from a representation if he
knows that a client is using his services to perpetrate a fraud, and the
lawyer may do so "noisily."'2 9 To effect a "noisy" withdrawal means
that the lawyer may notify anyone who may be relying on the lawyer's
work product that the lawyer is withdrawing and disavowing the work
product (such as an opinion letter). The lawyer can make this noise
even if it requires the disclosure of information otherwise protected
under Rule 1.6. The noisy withdrawal theoretically prevents the

28. R. 1.16(a) (explaining when mandatory withdrawal is required); R. 1.2(d)
(forbidding a lawyer to assist a client in fraudulent scheme).
29. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992).
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perpetration of the fraud because the other parties to the transaction
know that something is seriously wrong.
A noisy withdrawal might help protect the elderly ward. If the
lawyer were permitted, for example, to notify Jane's brothers of the
fact of his withdrawal, they would be sure to ask why. The lawyer
could be careful not to reveal Jane's confidential information and at
the same time not give legal advice to the brothers, who are nonclients. The lawyer would be permitted only to say to the brothers
that they should seek counsel of their own. 0 They probably would
recognize then that something was wrong.
As a general solution to the risk of financial abuse, however, a noisy
withdrawal is insufficient. First, it supposes that notice could go to
someone like a sibling, even though that person is "relying" on the
attorney's work product only in the general sense that the sibling
relies on the lawyer to see that the mother is well cared for. Second, it
assumes the existence and accessibility of someone to tell. There will
not always be another close relative, nor will the client necessarily
share with the lawyer the existence and location of the relatives.
Withdrawal does some good for the lawyer. It does little for the
elderly person who is being victimized.
Something more must be
possible.
C.

Optional Disclosure of Guardian'sMalfeasance

The next possibility is to give the lawyer for the guardian the option
to disclose the plans of the guardian.
As discussed in the
Introduction, Model Rule 1.6, especially as interpreted by the ABA,
forbids disclosure.32 Many jurisdictions, however, have declined to
adopt Model Rule 1.6 and instead permit lawyers to reveal
confidential information to prevent their clients from causing harm to
others.33 Even Model Rule 1.6 could be re-interpreted to allow for
disclosure under these circumstances. Disclosures under Model Rule
1.6 are permitted if those disclosures are "impliedly authorized" to
carry out the representation. The purpose of the representation of the
guardian is the welfare of the ward, and any disclosure of planned
wrongdoing by the guardian would serve that purpose.
Regardless of its textual basis, the question remains whether giving
lawyers the option to tell is a good idea. Professor Robert Tuttle, in
an exhaustive discussion of the ethical issues raised by representation
of many different types of fiduciaries, concludes that optional
disclosure is preferable:
30. See R. 4.3 cmt. 1.
31. See R. 1.14 annot. (stating similarly that withdrawal from representation of an
incompetent client helps the lawyer solve the lawyer's problem but leaves the client
worse off).
32. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Ga. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6(b) (2001).
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The fiduciary's moral and legal entitlement to protection of his
confidences weakens when he hides behind that protection in order
to injure the beneficiary-the one the fiduciary should protect. As
the fiduciary's moral claim weakens, the beneficiary's moral-if not
legal-claim to the attorney's protection strengthens, given the
fiduciary-client's "identity" and the attorney's capacity to protect

the beneficiary from fiduciary overreaching. Given the relative
balance between these competing moral obligations, the rules of
legal ethics should be changed to permit explicitly (rather than by
implication) the lawyer's discretion to disclose a fiduciary-client's
intended or ongoing breach of trust."'
Professor Tuttle is correct that the benefit of permitting disclosure
outweighs the cost. If in our example Jane decides to take advantage
of her control over her mother's financial affairs, her mother is at her
mercy, unless the lawyer can disclose the scam to people who can stop
it. The cost is that Jane may be reluctant to tell her lavyer about her
plans, and if she does not then the lawyer never has the chance to stop
her. The practical fact, however, is that for many transactions Jane
will have no choice but to seek the assistance of a lawyer. The lawyer
will have the chance to dissuade her and, in fact, is much more likely
to be able to dissuade her if he can threaten disclosure. If the threat
fails, he will have the power to blow the whistle on the scheme
whether she likes it or not. Given the vulnerabilities of the elderly
client, that power serves an important purpose.
It does not, however, go far enough. If the lawyer can choose
whether or not to tell, then some will not. Some will succumb to the
instinct not to get involved in what almost certainly could become a
nasty dispute, with the lawyer in the unfamiliar and uncomfortable
situation of testifying against a former client. But every time that
happens, a lawyer will sleep easier at the expense of economic abuse
of an elderly person. The obligation to protect the vulnerable should
be part of the obligation the lawyer assumes in representing a
caretaker. If the lawyer does not stop the malefactor, probably no
one will.
Furthermore, if the best way to handle a breach of a fiduciary duty
is to stop it before it causes harm, then a rule of mandatory disclosure
puts a powerful weapon in the hands of the lawyer. In counseling the
caretaker to behave, the lawyer can truthfully say, "if you do this I will
be required to report it." Surely most larcenous caretakers will be
cowed by the inevitability of disclosure. Mandatory disclosure,
backed by the prospect of civil liability, is the best protection the
elderly person may have.35
34. See Tuttle, supra note 23, at 941-42 (footnotes omitted).
35. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal.

1976) (en banc) (holding that a cause of action exists against psychotherapists who
know of a patient's dangerousness and fail to warn the potential victim). But see
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D. Mandatory Disclosure
In Section 51(4), the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers goes part of the way to putting a rule of mandatory
disclosure in place. Recall that the Restatement would permit the
elderly person to sue the caretaker's lawyer if the Rules of
Professional Conduct permitted disclosure and if the specified
conditions are met. 6
If a reasonable lawyer would disclose the intentions of the guardian
in order to prevent the harm, then a lawyer who fails to do so faces
liability to the ward. The lawyer is in a unique position to protect
someone who is vulnerable, and this section would make it part of the
lawyer's job to provide that protection. It is a proper response to the
problem of financial abuse of the elderly.
The Restatement does not, however, go far enough. At least two of
the qualifications in this section dilute its protections too much. First,
breaches of fiduciary duty that are not crimes or frauds can be just as
devastating to the elderly. In our example, if Jane loans the money to
herself for a business that fails, she has engaged in self-dealing and
thereby breached her fiduciary duty to her mother. Even if Jane has
not perpetrated a crime or fraud, she has breached a fiduciary duty to
her mother, leaving her mother just as destitute as if Jane took the
money to Vegas. The ward needs the lawyer's protection just as
much.
Second, the lawyer should have an affirmative duty to prevent the
client's malfeasance even if the lawyer has not assisted and is not
assisting in the activity. The obligation to disclose would not exist to
protect the elderly wards from the activities of the lawyers. Nor
would it exist merely to protect lawyers from having their skills turned
to evil purposes. The obligation would exist to protect the elderly
from the vulnerabilities that are inherent in their situation, and it is
imposed on lawyers because they are in a unique position to observe
and prevent abuses. To require lawyer involvement as a trigger for
the duty to disclose would, in part, defeat the protective purpose the
rule is designed to serve.
E. A Duty to Discover
The final, most extreme possibility would require lawyers who
represent guardians to investigate and discover wrongdoing by their
clients or face liability to the ward for the failure to do so. Only one
case, decided by an intermediate court of appeals twenty-five years
Hawkins v. King County, 602 P.2d 361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (finding that no cause
of action exists against a lawyer who knew client was dangerous but still helped client
to be released from jail, after which the client assaulted his mother).
36. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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ago, has imposed such an obligation.' The duty to investigate would
provide the most protection for the elderly, but in fact it would be
counter-productive. Lawyers are not accustomed to investigating
their own clients and affirmatively seeking to blow the whistle on
them. At best, it would make for an uncomfortable and unpleasant
attorney-client relationship. At worst, such representation would be
so fraught with the peril of malpractice that lawyers would avoid
representing guardians. Only the lawyers who could not find work
that was more pleasant and less risky would be left to do the work.
The elderly themselves would not be served by reducing the number,
and presumably the quality, of the lawyers willing to represent
guardians. Fees would certainly rise, and quality might well suffer.
Placing a duty to discover a guardian's misconduct would go too far.
CONCLUSION

Our population is growing older, and the incidence of incapacity
among the elderly is growing. Elderly people who have others
looking after their finances are especially vulnerable to financial
abuse. Because many of the mechanisms of financial abuse require
legal assistance, lawyers are routinely hired by guardians and other
caretakers and are therefore in a unique position to observe the
caretaker's actions. Where caretakers decide to take advantage of
their position, the best defense may be the lawyer. A lawyer who can
honestly tell that caretaker that he will expose his or her scheme if it
goes forward is a powerful deterrent. To permit but not require
lawyers for guardians and other caretakers to fulfill this role would
empower too many caretakers to abuse their position. Only a rule of
mandatory disclosure of planned malfeasance, backed up by the
threat of civil liability for keeping quiet, will enable the legal
profession to render an admittedly difficult but necessary service to
our aging population.

37. See Fickett v. Superior Court, 558 P.2d 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).
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